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THE ILLEGALITY OF THE GREEK SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS:
CONTRACT LAW'S RESPONSE TO THE GREEK
GOVERNMENT
By Paris Gyparakis*
I. INTRODUCTION
Greece is imperiled with one of the most disquieting economic states in its modern
history. The debt of roughly E300 billion, 1 which encompasses approximately 180% of the
GDP, 2 has fostered not only a depressed economy, but social and political upheaval which
has amounted to an equally concerning humanitarian crisis as well. The country once
considered "the privileged topos [of] European imaginary", 3 is now besieged with scathing
international criticism and scolding media attacks by their European counterparts. 4 It appears
as though all eyes are on Greece, with the question being "Will Greece ever recover?" and
"What would that recovery look like?" 5
The causes of the Greek debt crisis are deeply rooted in its history and subject to
scholarly debate. 6 However, the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008 highlighted the
severity of the debt, which confronted Greece with an imminent solvency crisis, : and the
international community with an imminent currency crisis. Greece, on the brink of default,

*J.D. Candidate, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, 2017. I would like to thank Professor
Miriam R. Albert and my colleagues in the Journal of International Business & Law for their unconditional
support and contributions to this note.
1 See General Government Gross Debt - Annual Date, EUROSTAT (Nov. 9, 2015, 1:30PM),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab--table&plugin=l&pcode-teina225&language=en;
see generhlly EUROPEAN COMM'N, GREECE: RECOVERY BACKED By DOMESTIC DEMAND AND EXPORT, 86
(2016), http://ec.europa.eu/economyjfinance/eu/forecasts/2016_autumn/elen.pdf.
2

id.

' See GREGORY JUSDANIs, BELATED MODERNITY AND AESTHETIC CULTURE: INVENTING NATIONAL
LITERATURE 13 (2012).
4 See, e.g., Tony Paterson, Greece Debt Crisis: German-GreekRelations Slump FurtherAfter Der Spiegel
Magazine Cover Prompts Controversy,INDEPENDENT (July 15, 2015),
http://www.independent. co.uk/news/world/europe/greece-debt-crisis-german-greek-relations-slump-furtherafter-der-spiegel-magazine-cover-prompts-10388792.html (citing German newspaper headlines such as "Sell
off your islands you bankrupts!" and "We Germans can pay off our debts because we get up and go to work!").
' See generally Dominique Venetsanopoulos, The Trillion-DollarQuestion: Can Greece Be Saved?, 19 ILSA
J. Int'l & Comp. L. 69 (2012).
6 See generallyMICHAEL MITSOPOULOS & THEODORE PELAGIDIS, UNDERSTANDING THE CRISIS IN GREECE:

FROM BOOM TO BUST (2011) (referring to some of the contributory factors leading to the current economic
crisis. Namely, a corrupt political system, an uncompetitive economy, and rampant tax evasion); PANAGIOTIS
PETRAKIS, THE GREEK ECONOMY AND THE CRISIS: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES (2012) (referring to both the

fiscal and political causes, however attributing the crisis mostly to the progressive tax system of Greece).
7 See generallyKevin Featherstone, The Greek Sovereign Debt CrisisandEMU: The FallingState in a Skewed
Regime, 49 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 193, 199 (2011) (stating that George Papakonstantinou, then finance
minister of Greece, announced a tripling of the 2009 debt).
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8
sought assistance from its Eurozone members and financial institutions in the form of
9
"bailout loans." To date, three major bailout loan packages have distributed over £300 billion
to Greece since 2010,10 and were negotiated between Greece and the "Troika," a pseudonym
for the tripartite coalition of financial institutions comprised of the European Commission
("Eurogroup"),11 the European Central Bank ("ECF"), and the International Monetary Fund

("IMF").
The first of these packages, "the 2010 Agreements" was signed on May 2, 2010, and
2
consisted of three loans totaling over £110 billion in disbursements. 1 Subsequently, "the
2012 Agreements" ensued for 6130 billion, as well as "the 2015 Agreements" for an14
various agreements,
additional 86 billion. 13 In exchange for these loans, Greece has signed
promising to implement a number of austerity measures imposed by the Trioka. 15 These
austerity measures however, have proven to be onerously harsh for the Greek people, and the
focal point of much of the Greek crisis discussion, as they have not seemed to help Greece
yet, which still faces rampant unemployment rates over 25%, 16 including 46% of its youth. 17
Of course, the idea of a sovereign debt crisis is not a new phenomenon in
international finance by any means. Argentina was imperiledwith $93 billion of debt before

"Eurozone" refers to various EU member states whose currency is the Euro. See Rosa M. Lastra, The
Evolution of the European CentralBank, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1260, 1261 (2012) (defining the term
Eurozone).
9 In this context, the term "bailout loans" refers to countermeasures to the Greek- government debt crisis,
known formally as "Economic Adjustment Programmes," by European economists. See Explaining Greece's
Debt Crisis,N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/intemational/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html?r=0 (last visited
Jan. 2, 2017).
10See Economic and Financial Affairs (EC), Financial Assistence to
Greece, http://ec.europa.eu/economyfinance/eu/countries/greece-en.htm (2015) (outlining all Financial and
economic support packages for Greece).
" Comprised of nineteen Eurozone member states.
12 See Intercreditor and Loan Facility Agreement, under Euro Area Loan Facility Act 2010, (May 20, 2010),
https://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/acts/2010/a710.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (pertaining to the
2010 agreements, which had a principal balance of €80 billion), Economic and Financial Affairs (EC),
Financial Assistence to Greece, http://ec.europa.eu/economyjfinance/eu/countries/greeceen
.hIm (2015) (outlining the First Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, and the joint package, with the
IMF committing the additional €30 billion under a stand-by arrangement for a total of E110 billion).
13 See generally, Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf__greecefafa.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (pertaining to the 2012
Agreements); Memorandum of Understanding Between the European Commission Acting on Behalf of the
European Stability Mechanism and the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece, Aug. 19, 2015,
http://ec.europa.eu/economyjfinance/assistance-eu-ms/greek loan facility/pdf/0 lmou 20150811 en.pdf
(last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (pertaining to the 2015 Agreements).
14Known collectively as the Memoranda of Understanding ("MoU"). See infra note 16.
'5 See discussion infra Part W.A.
16 See EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 1.
17 EUROSTAT, Youth Unemployment Rate in Europe (EUmember states) as ofJuly 2016 (seasonallyadjusted),
Statista, http://www.statista.com/statistics/266228/youth-unemployment-rate-in-eu-countries (last visited Jan.
10, 2017).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss1/12

2

Gyparakis: The Illegality of the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis: Contract Law's
THE ILLEGALITY OF THE GREEK SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS

defaulting in 2002, while Ecuador part-defaulted in 2008 with over $13 billion of debt."8
However, the story in Greece is unique by virtue of its Eurozone membership, and the
imbroglio created between Greece as a sovereign state, and its fellow Eurozone creditor
counterparts. 19 As several have noted, sovereign debt crises are radically different within a
monetary union such as the Euro, as no individual nation has control over the currency. 20
Simply put, European countries have more to lose than their investments, as their own
currency may be at the caprice of sovereign defaults, not only by Greece, but also by other
similarly situated countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal. 21 Their interest in avoiding a Greek
default, is their interest in ensuring the stability of the currency, and managing default
contagion within the Eurozone.22 In addition, a Greek default, forcing Greece to leave the
Eurozone against the people's wishes, will pose social and humanitarian concerns that nobody
can seem to fathom.23
Contemporary proposals to address the Greek crisis have included: abandoning the
Eurozone and European Union entirely, the so called "Grexit," which still enjoys popularity
in Greece amongst the left; declaring bankruptcy, a question whose potential outcomes have
agonized international legal scholars for decades 24 ; and even a solution found in macroeconomic computer game theory, espoused by former Greek Minister of Finance Yanis
Varoufakis. 25

18Daniel Ozarow, A "Velvet Grexit" is a Trick. Argentina, Ecuador andIceland Prove Default Can Work,
OPEN DEMOCRACY (July 23, 2015), https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/daniel-ozarow/"velvetgrexit"-is-trick-argentine-ecuador-and-iceland's-proves-defa.
1"See generally Michael G. Arghyrou & John D. Tsoukalas, The Greek Debt Crisis: Likely Causes, Mechanics
and Outcomes, (Cardiff U. Bus. Sch. Working Paper S. E2010/3, Apr. 2010), https:/orcamwe.cfac.uk/77853/1/e2010 3.pdf.
20See e.g., Paul De Grauwe, The Governance of a FragileEurozone (Ctr. for Eur. Policy Studies, Working
Paper No. 346 2011).
21 Id.
22Id.; EUROPE'S CRISIS, EUROPE'S FUTURE 1-20 (Kemal Dervis & Jacques Mistral eds., 2014).
231must note, albeit parenthetically, that the cultural implications that would result in a Grexit,relate to a farreaching plight in Neohellenistic Identity. The theory of continuity, which traces the glory of the ancient Greek
civilization as is emerges through the Byzantine and into modem Greece, has been coupled with an immense
amount of cultural pride with being considered "European" for modem Greeks, which has existed since the
Neohellenic Enlightenment. See generally GREGORY JUSDANIS, BELATED MODERNITY AND AESTHETIC
CULTURE: INVENTING NATIONAL LITERATURE 13-30 (2012), STATHIS GOURGOURIS, DREAM NATION:
ENLIGHTENMENT, COLONIZATION AND THE INSTITUTION OF MODERN GREECE 141-174 (1996).

24 Mostly because there is no currently accepted international regime which allows a
sovereign to declare
bankruptcy. For a detailed analysis on the issue of a global bankruptcy mechanism and respective international
law policies see Alice de Jonge, Returning to Fundamentals:Principles ofInternationalLaw Applicable to the
Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises, 36 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.REv. 1, 35-41 (2013) (exploring the popular
proposals for an independent oversight body: including the U.N Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) proposal, and the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) proposal among
others); see also Adam Brenneman, Note, Gone Broke: Sovereign Debt, PersonalBankruptcy, and a
Comprehensive ContractualSolution, 154 UPA. L. REV. 649, 670-684 (2006).
25See Adam Bouyamoum, Yanis Varoufakis Saw the Answer to Greece's Euro Crisis in Computer Game
Economy, THE NATIONAL (July 29, 2015) (reporting that the proposed theory comprises of a digital payments

system and online settlement platform, which would replace paper money and can be controlled by the Greek
government. This was inspired by Team Fortress(TF2) game company Valve; who's digital form of currency
is related to the number of goods available).
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However the most controversial solution was made by the Greek government itself,
after a parliamentary committee's public debt audit officially declared the Greek debt as
"illegal, illegitimate, and odious." 26 The report, which cites a series of findings and research,
concluded that because of the illegitimacy, illegality, and odiousness of the debt, the Greek
27
government is entitled to unilateral revocation of its bailout loan agreements. The big
question has now changed to "Is the Greek debt illegal, illegitimate and odious?" and, more
importantly, "If so, does this entitle Greece the remedy of unilateral revocation?"
Of course, the question still remains whether the Greek government plans on acting
upon this purported revocation right, or whether the report was only intended to put pressure
on Greece's creditors to accede to their demands, as it just happened to be published at a
2
fraught time during Greece's negotiations with creditors. " At least one news source has
proposed that the impetus of the report was most likely strictly political, and that the intended
audience was always meant to be domestic, so that in the event of a Greek default and
subsequent Grexit, the government could blame it on its creditors, with a well-wrought
narrative as support.29 In fact, the assertions made in the report, although incorporate legal
terms, are perhaps to be better understood as political statements, as opposed to sound legal
30
arguments, as very few legal authorities are actually cited. The legal terms that do appear
are merely used adjectivally, to describe various allegations, and not nounally, as they do not
relate to corresponding illegality doctrine per se. Irrespective of their use, they elucidate
issues related to the legal theory of discharging contractual obligations, and it is through this
analogy that this Note will assess the allegation's validity. As such, this Note focuses on the
contract defense claim of illegality in the context of the specific loan agreements, not the
31
odious debt doctrine, which has enjoyed relentless scholarly exposure, nor claims made
based on international law, in an effort to avoid greater implications that accompany treaty
interpretation in the context of sovereign debt. 32
Here, the loan agreements will be viewed as strict contractual instruments, when
analyzing whether or not the Greek Government is entitled to unilateral revocation of their
loan agreements, as they claim, under traditional Anglo-American contract law. As one might
Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, PreliminaryReport, (Apr. 5, 2015) (Greece),
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/Report-web.pdf.
27 Id. ("All the evidence we present inthis report shows that Greece not only does not have the ability to pay
this debt, but also should not pay this debt [...] because it is illegal, illegitimate, and odious").
28 See STRATFOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE, What it Would Take to Rule Greece's Debt Void (July 5, 2015),
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/what-it-would-take-rule-greeces-debt-void.
29 See id.
30 See generally id.
26 See

" See Evelyn Angelo, Greece & the Odious Debt Doctrine, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1619 (2013); see also Lee C.
Buchheit et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J 1201 (2007), Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt
to Odious Finance:Avoiding the Externalities of a FunctionalOdious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARv. INT'L L.J 109
(1991) (outlining the history and development of the odious debt doctrine: The odious debt doctrine extends
back to the 1920's, and has been invoked in several similar cases of sovereign debt crisis in Zaire and Ecuador,
however there has never been a ruling overriding the debt under the odious debt doctrine, and it appears as
though the international legal community has yet to define its applicability precisely.)
32 For a discussion pertaining to the legality of the European Union's authority to impose austerity measures
under International Law. See generally Joanna Pagones, Note, The European Union's Response to the
Sovereign Debt Crisis;Its Effect on Labor Relations in Greece, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1517 (2013)
(concluding that fundamental EU treaties do not authorize the European Union within their scope of authority
to infringe upon Greece's sovereignty to save the Euro).
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imagine at the outset, the answer to the question is probably not. However, the claims
themselves merit our attention, as they evoke critical questions pertaining to the politics of
law, and more importantly, loan agreement interpretation and enforceability in an everchanging international financial market.
II. THE TRUTH COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC DEBT
On April 4, 2015, the president of the Hellenic Republic, Ms. Zoe Konstantopoulou,
established the Truth Committee on Public Debt ("Committee"), a parliamentary subcommittee aimed at investigating the nature and circumstances surrounding the public debt of
Greece, and specifically, the validity of Greece's loan agreements.33 The Committee includes
35 international experts in the fields of law, economics, accounting and banking under the
team's scientific coordinator Eric Toussaine, 34 senior lecturer at the University of Liege. 35
The Committee released its first publication, The PreliminaryReport ("Report") on June 18,
2015, which served as a public debt audit, outlining the so-called "black box" of debt and its
respective problems from inception to current implementation, before characterizing it as
36
"illegal, illegitimate, and odious."
When viewed collectively, the Report asserts, by name, a number of defenses
recognized and well defined in contract law. These include coercion, fraud, misrepresentation,
breach of the duty of good faith, undue influence, unconscionability, illegality, and illegal
assignments. 37 It claims that these doctrines, both independently and collectively, justify
revocation of the loan contracts. Under Anglo-American contract law, these allegations are all
appropriately analyzed under the doctrine of unconscionability, which holds that a contract or
clause will be found unconscionable, and thus voidable, when it is so shockingly unfair or
onerously one-sided under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract. 38 However, before analyzing these specific illegality claims, a decisive distinction
regarding contract interpretation theory merits priority in this discussion; as the very nature of
the contracts themselves, directly affect not only how they are viewed and analyzed, but even
which defenses can be raised against them.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF CONTRACT LAW
Legal scholars have long recognized that differences between various types of
contracts should not only be acknowledged by the courts, but also reflected in substantive
law. 3 Consequently, three theories of contract law have latently developed within the
3 See generally Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supra note 26.
3 See Ozlem Onaran, Should Greece Pay Back its Debt?, SOCIALEUROPE.EU (Apr. 23, 2015),
https://www.socialeurope.eu/2015/04/greece-pay-back-debt.
35Robert Stevens, InternationalViewpoint, Syriza and the Fraudof Greece's "Truth Committee" on Debt,
World Socialist Website (wsws.org) (Aug. 4, 2015) https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/08/04/greea04.html.
36 See generally Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supra note
26.
17

See generally id

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
39Professor Ian R. Macneil was one of the first to conceptualize that different types of contracts were needed
38

to address diverse needs of various parties See generally Ian Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contractsand
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academy, and distinguish contracts based on two critical characteristics: the duration of the
40
agreements, and the degree of discreteness between the parties. The first theory, classical
contract law, was developed in the nineteenth century based on the writings of Samuel
42
41
Williston's The Law of Contracts, and is espoused by the Restatement of Contracts. This
43
theory is known to govern short-term, discrete transactions best, as its strict and formal
structure, limits interpretation of the agreement to the "four comers" of the document,
practically ignores the identity of the parties, and draws clear and explicit rules of
interpretation. 44 It is the very nature of these discrete transactions that support the traditional
classical contract remedy: unilateral revocation, the power to rescind or cancel a contract. The
theory behind this is that most risks of change that occur within the confines of short and
45
relatively simply transactions must be borne on a particular party to be effective.
In light of the increasing role of ongoing contractual relations in the United States
46
economy, neoclassicalcontract law developed in time, as a slight modification. This theory,
47
adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"), 4s has been cited as recognizing the interests of parties engaged in more long-term
contracts, and creates flexibility in agreements where the explicit terms may not adequately
address future problems. 4' By augmenting third-party rights and allowing gap-filling
provisions to embody industry norms, the neoclassical theory defends the party's intent and
5
freedom to contract from frivolous defenses. " It recognizes value in the "course of conduct"
between the parties, as an indicator when interpreting its terms, which may even serve to
"amend" the written terms when parties have consistently deviated from them.51 It follows
that remedies associated with neoclassical theory were crafted to address this less desirable
need to terminate the relationship. One such remedy is exempting benign contractual
deviations from constituting a breach, such as the harmless late tender of the delivery of52
as a potential remedy.
goods for example, and a limited availability of specific performance

Presentation,60 VA. L. REv. 589 (1974), Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term Economic
Relations Under Classical,Neoclassical,and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U.L.REv. 854 (1978).
40 See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical,and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U.L.REv. 854, 855 (1978).
41 See generally SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920).
42 See Macneil, supra note 40, at 855 n.2.
43See id. at 856-57 (characterizing discrete transactions as typically those with little personal involvement of
the parties, where communication is largely linguistic and limited to the subject matter of the transaction, and
where the exchange consists of a easily liquidated commodity and money and no significant past relations nor
likely future relations, "For example, a cash purchase of gasoline at a station on the New Jersey Turnpike by
someone rarely traveling the road is such a quite discrete transaction").
44See id. at 863.
" See id. at 883.
46 Keith A. Palzer, Relational Contract Theory and Sovereign Debt, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 727, n. 13 (1988)
(citing Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical,and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U.L.REv. 854 (1978)).
47See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
48See generally U.C.C. (1977).
41Palzer, supra note 46.
50 See Macneil, supranote 40, at 880-83.
51 See generally id.

52 See id. at 880.
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An example from the UCC is that a seller aggrieved by a buyer's breach of unfinished goods,
has the option to allow the complete manufacture of goods, or cease and resell for scrap or
salvage, the value of what has been produced. 53 This contrasts greatly from the analogous
classical contract remedy of simply suing for breach of contract, as it gives the non-breaching
party the power to avoid the travails of non-performance if it would better suit their interest.
Recognizing that traditional contract law theories still limit the parties generally to
the explicit terms of the contract, the need for even greater flexibility in certain contexts
endured. 54 Thus, relationalcontract law was conceptualized to deal with the complexities of
long-term, and multi-faceted relationships. " Unlike classical structure theories, relational
contract theory focuses on the ongoing relationship and past history of the parties, and not
solely the agreement's terms. 56 This differs from neoclassical theory, which although
addresses the needs of parties in an ongoing exchange, is still subject to the contours of the
document. Consequences of breach and litigation under relational contract law are replaced
by social and political adjustment, separate from governmental intervention, usually in the
form of arbitration or mediation.57 This enables the actual relationship of the parties, their
history, customs, interpretations and expectations to provide the internal rules for dispute
resolution, as opposed to state law. 5' These private negotiation remedies, although differ
greatly from traditional remedies and adjudication, are nevertheless grounded in contract law,
as their theoretical contours are set by the same juridical instrumentals accepted as binding, to
allow for realistic and practical results.59
When considering the Greek loan agreements, it follows that proper classification of
the contracts in question is of great importance, as it dictates the applicable theory of
substantive law and the available remedies that follow. However, it is the purpose of this Note
to address the claims made by the Greek government as would a competent court; namely, as
pleaded in the complaint (Report). To this end, each claim will be addressed under the same
substantive legal doctrine used by the Greek government in making their claims, beginning
with the substantive claims of illegality, those found within the contracts themselves,
followed by the procedural claims, those which arise from the bargaining and enactment
process.

13

See id. at 880 (citing U.C.C. §2-704).

54 Used in this context the term "traditional contract law" refers to both classical and neoclassical theories see

Macneil, supranote 40, at 854, n.2.
5 See Macneil, supra note 40, at 886-901.
56See id. at 886-901.
17 See id. at 886-901; Palzer, supra note 49, at 730-3
1.
58 See Palzer, supra note 49, at 730-31 (quoting Gidon Gottlieb, Relationsim: Legal Theoryfor a Relational
Society, 50 U. Ci. L. REv. 567, at 595 (1983), "litigation is largely irrelevant in relational contracts").
59 See Gottlieb, supranote 58, at 572-73 ("In sustained and inextricable relations, a principal use of contracts is
to provide a basis for renegotiations once a defective performance occurs.").
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IV. SUBSTANTIVE ILLEGALITY CLAIMS MADE BY THE GREEK
GOVERNMENT
A. Austerity Measures
The main claim of substantive illegality made by the Greek government, relates to
the austerity measures imposed by the Troika. 60 Namely, the Committee claims that the
austerity measures are illegal as they contravene human rights laws as well as the Constitution
6
of Greece and international treaties to which Greece is a party. These various austerity
measures, known in international finance loans as conditionalities, are common to "official
lending" type-agreements, 62 and describe the requirements Greece must follow in order to be
able to use the resources. Each loan agreement includes a provision that subjects subsequent
disbursement of funds on compliance of the budgetary and administrative discipline, set out
by various memorandums. 63 Only upon satisfactory compliance of measures and receipt of
an official certificate by the 'European Financial Stability Facility ("EFSM"), is Greece
entitled to disbursement. 64 In the 2010 agreements for example, Greece agreed to adopt
measures including budget and pension cuts, subsidy withdraws, tax code changes, changes in
the justice system and public administration of health and social security, and an increase in
its main sales tax from twenty-one to twenty-three percent. 65 The underlying policy behind
imposing austerity measures is, of course, relatively straightforward: creditor control over
capital investments to ensure economic growth. However, the austerity measures have only
proven to have adversely affected the economy; as by 2014, the economy shrunk by 25%, the
minimum pension had fallen below the poverty threshold, wages and salaries had dropped
40%, and minimum wage had fallen to its level of the 1970's.66 As the French economist
Thomas Piketty has noted, "the financial demands made by Europe have crushed the Greek
economy, led to mass unemployment and a collapse of the banking system, and made the

60

See suprap. 2 and accompanying text.

61

See Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supranote 26.
from the IMF and the World Bank. See Jon H. Sylvester, Impracticability,Mutual Mistake and

62 Especially

Related ContractualBasesfor EquitablyAdjusting the External Debt of Sub-SaharanAfrica, 13 Nw. J. Int'l L.

& Bus. 258, 283 (1992).
63 See, e.g., Loan Facility Agreement, under Euro Area Loan Facility Act 2010, May 20, 2010,
https://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/acts/2010/a710.pdf ("The release of Loans subsequent to the first
one shall be conditional upon the Euro Area Member States (except Greece) deciding favourably after
consultation with the European Central Bank on the basis of the findings of verification by the Commission that
the implementation of the economic policy of the Borrower accords with the adjustment programme or any
other conditions laid down in the Council decision on the basis of Articles 126(9) and 136 TFEU and the
MoU.").
64 One such agreement holds: "it shall be an additional condition to any Disbursement under the DBB
Installment that: EFSF has received a certificate of compliance satisfactory to it given by the Legal Advisor to
the State at the Ministry of Finance of the Beneficiary Member State in the form set out in Annex 2 (Certificate
of Compliance) to the Amendment Agreement and such certificate of compliance remains correct and accurate
as at the Disbursement Date"; see Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, supranote 13 at 57.
65 See generally Sylvester, supranote 62, at 28, THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THE AFRICAN DEBT CRSIS,
191 (Bade Onimode, ed., 1989); Bob Davis, IMF's Sweeping Demands Signal Shift, WALL ST. J., (May 3,
2010).
66 See Ozlem, supra note 34.
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external debt crisis far worse [...] The economy now lies broken, with tax receipts
nosediving, output and employment depressed, and businesses starved of capital." 67
Consequently, antipathy towards the Troika and the austerity measures is evinced by
citizens who riot the streets of Athens and lament the, "draconian domestic policy," 68
otherwise known as neoliberal reform. " Despite uniform disapproval, are the austerity
measures illegal?

When making their claim, the Greek government acknowledges not only that they
agreed to implement these measures, but even' that they are partially to blame for their
implications. They explicitly recognize that a state is primarily responsible for protecting and
promoting the human rights of its citizenry. 70 Notwithstanding these potentially defeatist
statements, they nevertheless conclude that the conditionalities, "supposedly intended to
rescue Greece," are nevertheless illegal and aimed at rescuing private creditors and forcing
71
neo-liberal reforms.
The first specific allegation made by the Greek government is that the austerity
measures have enabled various violations of human rights, by directly impacting living and
working conditions. 7 The government cites a series of findings highlighting the impact that
the reforms have made on the population, attributing them to the mandated spending and
public sector cuts and tax increases, ostensibly aimed at reducing the country's fiscal deficit.73
The allegation is that these measures have generally undermined basic human rights, and
particularly economic rights, by increasing unemployment, homelessness, and poverty as well
as reducing access to public services such as health care, social security and education. 74 The
impact of the adjustment measures was said to be more severe for the poor, pensioners,
people with disabilities and immigrants.75 Further, the Committee claims that these changes,
mistakenly called "reforms," violate key principals of human rights law reflected in
international treaties such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Thomas Piketty, Angela Merkel Must Act Now for Greece, Germany and the World, THE GUARDIAN (July 7,
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/07/angela-merkel-must-act-now-for-greece-germany-andthe-world.
68 See Marilena Simiti, Rage andProtest: The Case of the Greek IndignantMovement, Hellenic Observatory:
European Institute (Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe), The London School of
Economics and Political Science (February 2014),
http://www.Ise.ac.uk/europeanlnstitute/research/hellenic~bservatory/CMS%/20pdf/Pubiications/GreeSE/GreeS
67

E-No82.pdf. (In this paper, Professor Simiti describes a mass movement of social resistance to financial
assistance from the Troika (known as Aganaktismeni or the Indignant), and the draconian austerity measures
imposed by the government, despite its promises that the country would quickly recover from the crisis.
69 In this context, neoliberalism refers to displacement of Keynesian welfare, through liberalization and
privatization of expanded markets. See generallyThomas I. Palley, Keynesianism to Neoliberalism:Shifting
Paradigmsin Economics, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER (Alfredo Saad-Filho & Deborah Johnson
eds., 2005); see DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005).
70 See Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supranote 26, at 45 ("[T]he measures adopted
and implemented by the Greek government under the "bailout" programme have led to a range of human rights
violations. Since Greece bears primary responsibility for the protection and promotion of human rights for all
subject to its jurisdiction, it can be argued that it bears primary responsibility for such violations.").
7' See id. at 34.
72 See id. at 37-43.
71 See id. at 6.
71 See id. at 37-43.
71 See id. at 37-43.
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and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Rights ("ICESCR")
6
("ICCPR").
Secondly, the Committee claims that these measures directly violate the Greek
Constitution by infringing various constitutionally protected rights, including the right to
7
work, health, education, social security, housing and justice. The right to work for example,
was claimed to have been severely undermined in both the private and public sector by
reforms which compressed labor costs, reduced minimum wages, repealed allowances and
78
benefits, weakened collective bargaining and shrunk the public sector size. These labor
breakdown,
an
institutional
market reforms were deemed unconstitutional and the cause of
79
unemployment.
resulting in massive lay-offs, increased job insecurity and unrestrained
Similar arguments were made regarding the right to health being undermined, which was
attributed to deep reductions to public health expenditure, state hospital operating costs, and
outpatient pharmaceuticals, 8' as well as the right to education, which was ascribed to a
mandated reduction of teachers' pay and the merging and closing of schools."
In contract law, these conditionalities are simply conditions to the contract: terms
82
that limit or otherwise qualify promises, and exist because the parties have agreed to them.
83
Conditions are said to create a duty, in this case, that Greece must adhere to the austerity
measures in order to continue to receive funds. The language of the loan agreements clearly
and unambigtiously articulate that the financial support granted to Greece is dependent on
satisfaction of the measures, making these express conditions.84 Moreover, these can be
further qualified as express conditions precedent, which must be satisfied prior to
performance of the other party,85 as the agreements call for multiple disbursement dates, each
subject to the satisfaction of program measures. 86 Contract law on fulfilling express
7
conditions is generally straightforward, usually requiring strict adherence.8 However, illegal
conditions, or ones violating public policy, will not be automatically upheld.

76

See Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supranote 26, at 41.

77See id. at 37-43 (citing The impact of the crisis onfundamental rightsacross Member States of the EU

Country Report on Greece,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/510014/IPOLSTU(2015)510014_EN.pdf).
78See id. at 37-43.
79 See id. at 37-43.

'0 See id. at 37-43.
81 See id.at 37-43.
82 See Arthur L. Corbin, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 31.1
83

(Joseph M. Perillo et al.eds., Rev. ed. 2015).

id.

One such provision reads: "the support granted to Greece is made dependent on compliance by Greece with
measures consistent with such decision and laid down in a Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies,
Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality and Technical Memorandum of
Understanding." See Intercreditor and Loan Facility Agreement, supra note 12.
85 See Corbin, supra note 82.
86 See Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supra note 26 (citing European Commission,
2010. Intercreditor and Loan Facility Agreement, under Euro Area Loan Facility Act 2010.
http://goo.gl/QeiwUu [Accessed June 12, 2015], Loan Facility Agreement, Annex 6 - Assignment Agreement
and Schedule to the Assignment Agreement, and Article 13).
84

87 See 5 Samuel Williston & Walter H.E Jaeger, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §675 (3d ed. 1957)

("conditions must be fulfilled exactly or no liability can arise on the promise which such conditions qualify").
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The doctrine of illegality and public policy recognizes unenforceability of
contractual provisions if legislation provides that it is unenforceable, or if the enforcement
interest is clearly outweighed by a strong public policy interest.88 Most often, the doctrine
applies to cases where either the formation or performance of the contract is founded on an
illegal consideration, such as a tort or a crime. 89 The approach to determining illegality,
espoused by the Second Restatement of Contracts, calls for a "balancing," where courts
consider a number of factors in weighing their decision, such as: the parties' justified
expectations and the likely result if enforcement is denied, as well as the strength of the public
policy, seriousness of the misconduct and the extent of which it was deliberate.9" Further,
because freedom of contract is a public policy of itself,91 in the absence of legislation or a
strong public policy, courts are less likely to declare the provision illegal, as this severely
undermines freedom of contract. 92
When a finding of illegality does occur, the contract or provision is considered void,
and the court usually leaves the parties exactly where they found them. 9' However, there are
exceptions to the no restitution remedy, 94 and courts rarely apply this rule in its absolute
fashion. 95 The legal effect of contracts against public policy is said to vary with the character
of the factors that cause them to be against public policy.

88 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

96

§178 (1981); but see CISG Art.4 (1980) (where UNIDROIT

Principles and Principles of European Commercial Contracts are silent about issues of illegality).
89 See C.I.T Corp. v. Breckenridge, 63 Cal.App.2d 198, 200 (1944) (holding that a contract founded upon an
unlicensed person to act as a contractor is void, as founded on an illegal consideration); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §178, 190, 192 (1981) (outlining various unenforceable contracts: whose formation
or performance is a tort or a crime, against public policy, promises detrimental to marital relationships, and
whose promise involves a commission of a tort); see also e.g., Sayres v. Decker Auto. Co., 145 N.E. 744 (N.Y.
1924) (holding that an agreement to defraud third party is illegal).
90 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §178(2-3) (1981) (enumerating some factors that the court
should look at in making this determination; some of which include: the parties' justified expectations,
forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation
or judicial decisions, the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy, the seriousness of
any misconduct involved and the extent to which it was deliberate, and the directness of the connection
between that misconduct and the term).
This contemporary approach has been contrasted from the rather firm position of Section 512 of the First
Restatement which held that if formation or performance of a contract is illegal or otherwise opposed to public
policy, it is automatically considered an illegal contract, with restitution automatically denied. See IAN AYRES
& GREGORY KLASS, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 556; see generally Walter Gelhom, Contracts and Public
Policy, 35 COLUM. L.REv. 679 (1935).
91 See Computrol, Inc., Newtrend, L.P., F.3d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding the basis for enforcement of
limitation of liability clause is a strong public policy favoring freedom of contract).
92 See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 208-12 (2004).
93 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 (1981), Arthur L. Corbin, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 79.1
(Joseph M. Perillo et al. eds., Rev. ed. 2015).
94 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §197 (1981) ("unless denial of restitution would
cause
disproportionate forfeiture"), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§198-199 (1981) (recognizing two
more exceptions: where a party was excusably ignorant or not equally in the wrong, and when a party did not
engage in serious misconduct and withdrew from the transactions before the improper purpose had been
achieved).
9 See Corbin, supra note 83, § 79.
96 d.; Compare Family Financial Servs., Inc. v. Spencer, 677 A.2d 479 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (holding a
contract unenforceable as a violation of a public policy where the mortgage transaction was found
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Considering the purported illegal conditions in Greece's loan agreements, a court of
law would have to consider numerous factors and policies when applying the balancing test.
A court will certainly acknowledge the inviolable public policy against unconstitutional
government actions and violations of human rights laws. However, the inquiry will most
likely begin with the contract itself, by questioning the intention of the parties and their
expected result, namely, to provide financial assistance to Greece by requiring measures
intended on restructuring the economy. A court would unquestionably acknowledge the
adverse effects which have resulted by the austerity measures, but would most likely conclude
that the austerity measures do not represent flagrant and intentional illegal conduct per se, but
only by virtue of their implementation have these adverse results ensued. This contrasts
greatly with the preponderance of case law on this subject that mostly deals with clear illegal
97
conduct specifically prescribed by the contract itself. Moreover, a court would acknowledge
the general criticism from the international community of the effectiveness of similar
adjustment programs, as far as they interfere with the debtor countries' sovereignty and
autonomy, but also the fact that this criticism is known to be of a polemic nature, often
"motivated by the internal political situations in the debtor countries."' '
Another important distinction is the fact that, although the Greek government is
some of the austerity measures violate international treaties, the majority of the
that
claiming
examples given in the report actually relate to the purported violations of their own
constitution and labor laws. 99 Moreover, the generally accepted position under the law of
treaties is that a party to an international agreement cannot invoke its own domestic law to
escape its international obligations.' 00
Other factors taken into consideration include what purpose will be served in
denying enforcement, and what the likely result would be. This question is significant in light
of the traditional "no restitution remedy," as a void contract will leave Greece with whatever
funds they have collected so far with no obligation to repay, a far cry from the party's
reasonably expected outcome. 101
Instead, a court of law is more likely to recognize a way to avoid injustice and
respect the party's freedom to contract and intentions; by allowing for alterations or omissions
to the provisions found illegal. Allowing for alterations to the terms is consistent with the

unconscionable) with Naylor v. Conroy, 134 A.2d 785 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) (where the court
enforced the contract even though it violated a statute that forbid doing business on Sunday).
17 See e.g., Meyer v. Hawkinson, 626 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 2001) (holding a contract void for illegality when the
alleged contract was to share the proceeds of a winning Canadian lottery ticket in ajurisdiction where gambling
agreements are forbidden by statute), Homami v. Iranzadi, 211 Cal.App.3d 1104 (Cal.Ct.App. 1989) (holding
that an oral agreement for the payment of loan interest in violation of the tax code is unenforceable); see also
HILLMAN, supra note 92, at 77-100.
'8Carsten Thomas Ebenroth, The ChangingLegal Frameworkfor Resolving the Debt Crisis:A European's
Perspective,23 INT'L LAW. 629,632 (1989) (citing Montagon, The IMFand Debt Policy, INT'L BANKING REV.

153, 153 (Europe/Banker's ed. 1986).
99See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
'00 Davidson Sommers et al., Conflict Avoidance in InternationalLoans and Monetary Agreements, 21 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 463 (1956) (citing 5 G.H HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 185 (1943); 2 C.C
HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1454 et seq. (2d ed. 1947); I L.F.L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 829 et seq.

(6" ed., Lauterpacht, 1947).
' In fact, given the severity of the Greek debt which involves the second-largest currency in the world, an
automatic write-down of the loans may very well collapse the entire global financial system.
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reasonable test, which holds that if provisions can be reasonably altered to render them
enforceable, then a court can determine what is reasonable considering all available evidence
and the intention of the parties at the time of contracting.' °2 This approach is taken by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts as well as the U.C.C., 103 and aligns with judicial
preferences of deference towards freedom of contract and preserving the essence of the
parties bargain. A similar contract theory, divisibility of contracts, recognizes that agreements
with multiple sets of promises and performances can essentially be divided into parts. 104
Under this theory, courts may enforce any divisible portion of the contract, and hold other
portions as unenforceable, and avoid the devastating effect of voiding entire agreements. 105
It may be true that the conditionalities of the loan agreements since 2010 have only
destabilized the economy even more. In fact, compelling independent research has shown that
absent austerity measures, the economy in Greece would have only stagnated rather than lose
25% of its GDP.' ° However, in light of the strong policies favoring enforcement as well as
the theories of contract interpretation and divisibility, a court would unlikely render the entire
loan agreement void as the Committee has implied. At best, a court will render only some
specific provisions unenforceable.
B. Other Contract Provisos
In chapter seven of the Report, the Committee cites various clauses in the
agreements themselves that are thought to be abusive or otherwise illegal, the first being a
waiver of immunity clause. This would deprive the Greek state of the right to assert sovereign
immunity in the event that arbitration or litigation disputes pursuant to the loan agreements
ensue. 107 This claim is grounded in the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which shields foreign
sovereigns from the jurisdictional reach of private parties. 108 However, strict doctrinal
adherence, known as absolute immunity, has been largely abandoned in the twentieth
century. 109 Most states have now adopted the so-called restrictive theory of immunity, under
which foreign sovereigns are no longer automatically immune from suit, and creditors can

102
103

104
10'

See Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544 (Ohio 1975).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184(2) (1981), U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977).
See 6 Williston on Contracts § 860 (3d ed. 1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240 (1981).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240 cmt. e (1981) ("[T]he court's decision will usually depend

on considerations of fairness."); see e.g., Management Serv. Corp. v. Development Assic., 617 P.2d 406 (Ut
1940).
"' See Ozlem, supranote 34.
107The exact wording of this provision is as follows: "The Beneficiary Member State, HFSF and the Bank of
Greece hereby irrevocably and unconditionally waive all immunity to which each of them is or may become
entitled, in respect of itself or its assets, from legal proceedings in relation to this Agreement and each of its
Annexes and Schedules (including the Annexes to such Schedules) and each Pre-Funding Agreement,
including, without limitation, immunity from suit, judgment or other order, from attachment, arrest or
injunction prior to judgment, and from execution and enforcement against its assets to the extent not prohibited
by mandatory law." See Intercreditor and Loan Facility Agreement, supra note 12.
108See Leo J. Bouchez, The Nature and Scope of State Immunityfrom Jurisdictionand Execution, 10 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 4 (1979).
'0' See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt,2014 U.ILL. L. REV. 67 (2014).
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overcome sovereign immunity under various exceptions. 110 In the U.S for example, the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) provides the commercial activity
exception, which exposes a foreign sovereign to suit when it engages in commercial activities,
as opposed to public activities, recognizing the momentous right of private party litigants to
sue foreign sovereigns to enforce judgments. " Further, this exception has also been
recognized by both the International Court of Justice and by the United States Supreme Court
112
Even
in the context of international loan and bondholder agreements in a number of cases.
so, international loan creditors often insist that sovereign borrowers waive their immunity just
for good measure, as consistent with efforts to safeguard potential claims against the
sovereign. 11 As it happens, such provisions are considered common to international loan
agreements. 114 The concern amongst legal scholars is never the existence of these clauses, but
15
rather their practical application and the jurisdictional questions that they pose; however,
by
its own is
this is not at issue here. As such, the claim that the waiver of immunity clause
illegal is extremely weak.
The second clause the Committee cites as illegal is a severability clause, which
states that in the event that a provision is judicially noted as illegal, void, or unenforceable,
116
This rather innocuous
the remaining provisions of the agreement are to remain in force.
clause is frequently employed in contemporary contracting, as some consider it a boilerplate
11 7
provision, and most courts do not hesitate to enforce them. In fact, the absence of such
clause tends to indicate that the underlying contract is not severable." The underlying theory
is that although a particular provision may be deemed illegal, it shall not undermine the entire
contract. 19 This is consistent with the judicial tendency that generally recognizes the

ll See Julian G. Ku, Don't Cryfor Sovereign Debtors: Why Argentina'sDefeat in US Courts Does Not Justify

a Sovereign Debt Treaty, 36 U.PA.J. INT'L L. 433,443 (2014).
1l"
See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (2003).
112 See e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S 607 (1992) (where the United States Supreme
Court decided that the commercial activities exception applied to in the context of bondholder agreements,
where private parties could sue Argentina for breach of performance for government bond payouts),
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 57, 25 (Feb. 3).
for State Intervention: The Origins of Sovereign
113 See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Contracting
Debt Arbitration,73 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 335, 342 (2010).
114 Id.
115 See Ku, supra note 110, at 443-445 (where Professor Julian G. Ku asserts that, although a waiver of
immunity subjects the sovereign to monetary judgments, United States law still hinders the creditors ability to
execute these judgments against a sovereign's assets, and by simply moving attachable assets out of the
jurisdiction before execution, the sovereign is essentially litigation-proof).
116 The exact wording of the provision is as follows: "If any one or more of the provisions contained in this
agreement should be or become fully or in part invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect under any
applicable law, the validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining provisions contained in this Agreement
shall not be affected or impaired thereby. Provisions which are fully or in part invalid, illegal or unenforceable
shall be interpreted and thus implemented according to the spirit and purpose of this Agreement." See
Intercreditor and Loan Facility Agreement, supra note 12.
".7 See i.e., Diverse Elements, Inc. v. Ecommerce, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 1378 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (holding a
severability clause valid under Florida law); Effingham County v. Roach, 329 Ga. App. 805, 764 S.E.2d 600
(2014).
11 See generally 14 Williston on Contracts § 45:6 (3d ed. 1962) (citing Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461
S.W.3d 426 (Mo. 2015).
119 See John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REv. 203 (1993).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss1/12

14

Gyparakis: The Illegality of the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis: Contract Law's
THE ILLEGALITY OF THE GREEK SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS

intentions of the parties and their respective "meeting of the mind."' 120 Courts that decide on
the issue of severability do so irrespective of the existence or exact wording of the
severability clause, but rather in light of the nature of the illegal provision sought to be
severed, and its relation the contract as a whole. 121 Overall, courts have predominantly
favored severability in their determination, as long as it is consistent with the intent of the
parties. 122 The claim made here is that the severability clause is itself illegal, however, this
independent illegality claim may be unprecedented and runs afoul of the nature of severability
clause jurisprudence. The severability clause independently is likely to be viewed as rather
innocuous, and neither burdensome nor unfair.
The third clause cited by the Committee as illegal is a waiver of defense clause. It
states that, "provisions of [this] agreement have to be implemented even if they were found
illegal, and that Greece hereby irrevocably and unconditionally waives all defenses." 123 A
court would not need to even consider the first part of this provision as illegal contracts are
automatically void by operation of law. 124 However, a court could very well consider this
waiver of defense clause as unfair, as such clauses are usually only employed within the
context of assignments and delegations of financial agreements. In those cases, a party would
125
agree "not to assert against the assignee any defenses it might have against the assignor."'
Such agreements are given substantial deference by courts and are usually upheld,
recognizing not only the parties "broad latitude within which to fashion their own remedies,"
but also the commercial necessity that a prospective third-party assignee is guaranteed
meaningful security. 126 Further, the UCC protects the use of waiver of defense clauses for
financing leases for the sale of goods as well as for future services, but only by an assignee of
a funding source of the payee. 121 Otherwise, courts have held that a waiver of defense clause
in a two-party transaction is unwarranted and out of place as the contracting parties are said to
be protected by their own covenants, representations and warranties, and the obligation to pay
from the debtor should not continue where there is an egregious breach by the creditor.121
Consequently, the provision cited by the report, as written, is not referring to the assignee' of
the contracting party creditors but to themselves, and is arguably an illegal proviso, either as
onerously one-sided (unconscionable) or as transgressing the duty of good faith and fair
dealing in contracting. 129
However, as previously asserted, courts favor the severability presumption, and
have held that when the illegal portion can be severed from the rest of the contract, the

120
121

See RESTATEMENT
id.

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 201(1) (1981).

122 See JANIS, supra note 111.
123 See

Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supranote 26.

124See supraaccompanying notes 85-93.
125 See

Citicorp of North America Inc. v. Lifestyle Communications Corp., 836 F.Supp. 644, 655 (S.D. Iowa

1993).
Barry A. Graymor, Are Hell or High Water Clauses and Waiver of Defense Clauses Enforceable?, Business
Law News (The State Bar of California) (Winter 1999) (citing Colorado Interstate Corp. v. CIT
Group/Equipment Financing, Inc., 993 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1991)).
127 See generally UCC §§ 2-407, 2-508, 9-403.
128 2 Com. Asset-Based Fin. § 14:46.
129 See infra notes 189-192 and accompanying text.
126

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

15

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
THE JOURNAL

OF INTERNATIONAL BusINEss & LAW

remaining contract is still enforceable.
provision.

130

As such, a court will, at best, simply strike this

V. PROCEDURAL ILLEGALITY CLAIMS
The second cluster of illegality claims considers various aspects that stem from the
bargaining process of the parties, which are said to be illegal or violate public policy. The
Committee cites three types of procedural illegality: the choice of law governing future
disputes; various debt-mechanism procedures embedded within the contracts, which allow
creditors to sell their right to collect on the loans; and the failure of the creditors to comply
with certain enactment procedures prior to contracting.
A.

Choice of Law Provision

The first of the Committee's procedural illegality claims, calls into question the
illegality of the choice of law provision. That is, they claim that English law as the governing
law for future litigation or arbitration, illegally facilitates the circumvention of the Greek
Constitution and international human rights. 131 In making this claim, the Committee neither
refers to any specific provision of the Greek Constitution nor cites any examples in which
English law would violate the Constitution or infringe on human rights.132 In fact, the only
reason mentioned as to why their creditors would chose English law, is that133it would favor a
to them.
strict interpretation of the laws of contract, which is more favorable
Of course, the very nature of international contracts heightens the risk of a conflict
between different laws and court systems within this area, as it is possible that the laws of
several jurisdictions could be involved with multiple, courts exercising jurisdiction over the
very same dispute. The Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws, holds that the essential
validity of a choice of law agreement is left entirely to the choice of the parties, as it is after
all a part of the quid-pro-quo, considering it is governed by a legal system which the
agreement is closely connected. 134 Limitations arise only when the agreement has no
13
deemed reasonable. 1
substantial relationship with the state of choice, or is not otherwise
Even within the context of multi-state contracts, the restatement recognizes that parties may
per se, as it may be necessary to have a
chose a law that is unconnected with the agreement
136
parties.
the
all
by
understood
system
stable legal

88-96 and accompanying text.
See Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supra note 26, at 45.
132 See id. ("By choosing English law as the governing law for those agreements, the implicit objective of the
creditors in their choice of law clause was to bypass the Greek Constitution and Greece's international human
rights obligations. And thus, to the extent that English law does not incorporate or conflicts with, Greece's
human rights treaty and customary obligations, it is invalid and merits no obligation to be honoured.").
133See id.
134 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960) (permitting the parties to
choose the governing law within certain limitations, among which is that that the agreement has a substantial
relationship with the law of choice or not otherwise unreasonable).
130 See supra notes
131

135 id.
136

Id., comment f, pp.21-22.
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Regarding English contract law generally, it has been noted that the International
financial community has a history of the English law preference.' 37 This is perhaps due to
both the more pragmatic and commercial expressionist approach of English law, as well as for
its well-defined case law support."13 Further, English contract law is also preferred because of
the country's conceptual sophistication within its law, which is capable of accommodating
disputes and transactions within its framework. 139 In light of the English law preference and
considering the nature of the provision being in the original agreed-upon transaction, it is very
unlikely to be held as illegal.
B.

Debt-Mechanism Procedures

The second procedural illegality claim involve the so-called "debt mechanisms"
provisions that allow creditors to transfer borrowed funds to private financial institutions.
This would essentially allow transferring official debts, those owed to international financial
institutions such as the Troika, 140 to commercial debts, those owed to commercial banks or
other private entities. 14' This practice, known in finance as loan asset sales, enables a
financial institution to transfer an asset inter-bank, analogous to the secondary market trading
of bonds or stocks. 142 The contract law parallel is known as an assignment of rights, which
involves a contracting party assigning their right of performance to a third party; that is, one
not in privity with the initial contractors.141
The claim by the Committee is that these encompass illegal assignment of rights that
transform public debt into private debt and allow for the eventual transformation of Greece's
public state assets to private bonds. 144 To this, the Committee enumerates the exact debt
mechanisms found within the loan agreements. The first of these, under the 2010
agreements, 145 provides for the transformation of debt securities into bilateral loans. 146 This
essentially converts the debt owed to the IMF and ECB to private entities or states. The
Committee claims that this mechanism, "hidden in an Annex," allows a transfer of contractual

137

See Keith A. Palzer, Relational Contract Theory and Sovereign Debt, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 727, n.68

(1988) ("Almost all sovereign loan agreements have stipulated adjudication in New York or Longon, with New
York or English law controlling. This is due to the growing sophistication and specialization of those financial
centers as well as the unacceptability of a developing country forum to creditor banks lending to developing
country sovereigns."); see generally RAVi C. TENNEKOON, THE LAW & REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE (1991).
138 See RAvi C. TENNEKOON, THE LAW & REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 23 (1991).
139 id.
140 See generally Sylvester, supra note 62 at 283.
141 id.
142

See TENNEKOON, supra note 138, at 103.

143 See IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 1077

(8th ed. 2012); see also In re Stralem
303 A.D.2d 120 (N.Y.S.2d 2003).
144 See Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supra note 26, at 29-32.
145 Known as the "Loan Facility Agreement" and "Intercreditor Agreement."
See Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supranote 26, at 29 (citing European
Commission, 2010. Intercreditor and Loan Facility Agreement, under Euro Area Loan Facility Act 2010.
http://goo.gl/QeiwUu (Accessed June 12, 2015).
146
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7
rights from bondholders to any new party through simply completing a form.' The second
48
debt mechanism mentioned, found within the 2012 agreements, 1 allows for re-capitalization
of Greek banks, a process where the bank's bonds and other securities are adjusted or
50
restructured, 149 and for recycling of debt through private sector involvement, "PSI"' and
"the debt buy-back operation", allowing creditors to buy back even existing debt
instruments.'51 The last debt mechanism cited, known in finance as "securitization", involves
the pooling and repackaging of loans into securities, which are then sold to investors. 152 The
Committee asserts that securitization, as well as PSI, allow for the acceleration of the
privatization process of public debt, which includes state assets such as state owned
companies, land, buildings and natural gas storage rights, which in turn, would transform
53
result for Greece. 1
valuable public assets into means for debt repayments, a devastating
They also claim, that these are done with malice intentions - a scam on the part of private
creditors to exploit raising capital. In reality, these mechanisms .simply allow for an
common practice within the international
assignment of contractual rights, and are considered
54
1
transactions.
secured
for
even
finance community,
Contrary to the common law rule against assignments, the development of contract
law in the nineteenth century has recognized the importance of alienability of intangibles such
as securities, stocks, funds and other assets, as essential to commerce and trade. 155The
assignment of the right to receive an amount in the future, known as an account receivable, is
one of these recognized types. Ordinarily, an assignment of this nature would be subject to
56
Article 9 of the UCC, because of its frequent use as a financial device. 1 However, an
exclusion from Article 9 exists when the assignment is for the sole purpose of collection, and
American jurisdictions usually refer to common law rules as well as respective statutory
enactments. 157 Under general contract doctrine, an assignment of contractual rights is
presumptively valid unless the assignment would materially change the duty of the other
party, or materially increases the burden or risk imposed. 5sAccounts receivables usually

14 See Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supra note 26, at 29 (citing Loan Facility

Agreement, Annex 6 -Assignment Agreement and Schedule to the Assignment Agreement, and Article 13).
14'Known as the Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, "MFAFA".
14'BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (6"' ed. 1990).
A term used in international finance for the financing of economic crisis, which enables public sector
...
participation to essentially finance the crisis. See William R. Cline, "PrivateSector Involvement" in Financial
CrisisResolution: Definition,Measurement,and Implementation 3 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper
No. 18, 2012).
151
See Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supra note 26, at 30.
152 Alfred J. Puchala, Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 137, 138 (1989).
153 See Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supra note 26, at 30.
154See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 640 (7th ed. 2014).
155 Id.
156

Id. at 643.

157 id.

' See U.C.C. § 2-210(2) (1977), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2)(a) (1981), Crane Ice
Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing & Heating Co., 128 A. 280 (Md. Super. Ct. 1925) (holding that an assignment
of a contract right materially changed the obligor's duty when the quantity contracted for was based on past
performance of the parties: "[I]t is clear that the rights and duties of the contract under consideration were of so
personal a character that the rights that [one party's rights] cannot be assigned [... J without defeating the
intention of the parties to the original contract").
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pose slight assignment problems, as one can imagine that simply changing the intended
beneficiary neither changes the duty nor the risk of the indebted party. 159 Even in the case of
secured transactions, a creditor-party's grant in its accounts receivable to an assignee the sole
purpose of collection, only provides security for repayment that the original creditor had
pursuant to the parties' agreement. 160 These assignments are intended as an outright transfer
of an account receivable and have been distinguished within the law of secured transactions
from those made as collateral security for a debt, which create the security interest. 161 Even
more problematic assignments exist when the party has not yet earned payment by
performance under the contract and tries to convert this into present cash, however these are
treated on an ad hoc basis and are not considered here. 162 Only illegal assignments, those
outlawed by statute or a strong public policy are considered automatically prohibited. 163
However, these are usually limited to assignment of structured settlements, the right to
payment under a public contract, or assignment of rights in life insurance policies. 164
The existence of an assignment clause in the contract is often given substantial
165
deference by courts, simply reluctant to interfere with the parties' freedom of contract.
Even more deference is given to free assignment clauses, which place no limitation on
assignment. These have even been honored in cases where the rights would not otherwise be
capable of assignment, as courts have acknowledged that as part of the bargained for
exchange, the parties have contracted for all possible assignments, and thus submitted to any
that may ensue. 166
In the case of Greece's financial loan agreements, the lenders have already
performed, and since the assigned right in questions is of an account receivable for collection
purposes only, UCC Article 9 does not apply. 167 We must simply ask under contract law,
whether the assignment materially changes the duty or burden of Greece to the potential
assignees. The Committee has not offered a strong reason that changing the intended
beneficiary of the loan payments would alter the duty or imperil Greece in any way to make
payment. They indirectly claim that the transfer of public to private debt constitutes a material
burden, as State assets are potentially in the hands of private parties. However, this argument
lacks merit, as those pubic security interests were pre-existing parts of the original
agreements, and were not created by the assignment provision. As such, state assets were
already within the potential reach of creditors and cannot be considered a material burden, or
9 See IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 1079 (8th

ed. 2012).

See generally U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (1977), U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(4) (1977).
161 See PERILLO, supranote 154 (citing International Harvester v. Peoples Bank & Trust, 402 So.2d 856 (Miss.
1981) and Aquaplex v. Rancho La Valencia, 297 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. 2009)).
160

Id.
163See PERILLO, supranote 154, at 651.
162

See id at 651.
See generally John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993); Joseph M. Perillo,
CONTRACTS 652 (7th ed. 2014); Richard A. Lord, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 74, at 40 (4th ed. 1990) (citing
D.L Stem Agency v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 43 F. Supp. 167 (upholding a provision in a
contract expressly permitting an assignment)).
166 See Ducan Services v. ExxonMobil, 722 F.Supp.2d 640, 648 (D.Md. 2010) ("[T]he court believes that
the
clear agreement of the parties to make the contract freely assignable controls, and no inquiry into the potential
increase in burdens prompted by the assignment is necessary."); see also Barnes v. Gulf Oil Corp., 795 F.2d
358 (4 h Cir. 1986).
164
165

161

See U.C.C. §§ 9-109(a)(1), 9-109(d)(4) (1977).
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any burden for that matter. Had the secured transaction been solely a part of the assignment
provision, would there be a better argument.
The argument that the privatization process is a scam for member-state lenders to
raise capital through sales is also flawed. In fact, the main reasons why banks sell a loan's
assets has been found to be regulatory; to reduce of high-risk weighting assets, in order to
168
In
maintain capital dependency in the market, as well as to improve profitability ratios.
contracts,
original
the
in
agreed-upon
as
clause
assignment
an
addition, the existence of
severely undermines Greece's argument even more. Further, similar debt mechanisms are
frequently used in international loans in order to finance debt of countries on the brink of
insolvency. Some examples include private sector involvement used to finance Thailand's
70
debt in 1997,169 market-based security swaps employed for Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina,
and securitization mechanisms for Mexico. 171 Not only are these mechanisms common
practice in the field, but72they have been noted by scholars to be components of successful
crisis finance strategies. 1
Securitization, for example, has actually been known to be more beneficial for the
indebted country then the creditors. 173 It allows the debtor nation to benefit from the transfer
of loans to investors who have the resources to allow them to reschedule their repayment
structure and work through their short-term problems, as opposed to the original lenders,
which lack the ability to do so. 4In addition to preventing a hiatus in interest payments,
securitization allows the debtor nation to purchase their own securitized debt, saving the
175
market discount that would otherwise escape to the private sector. This serves as a huge
advantage for debtors who are otherwise prohibited from directly repurchasing under the loan
agreements. 176 In fact, Ecuador took advantage of this in 2008, when it part-defaulted on 70%
of its debt that it declared "illegitimate", then bought back bonds at a third of their value
eliminating billions of dollars off its debt."'
Whether or not the securitization proposal truly addresses the needs and problems of
debtor countries is questionable,17 ' as there is very good argument that this is nothing more
than a "Cat in the Hat" solution of simply spreading the problem around to make it less

168
169

See PERILLO, supranote 154, at 103.
See generallyRamesh C. Garg, The Casefor Debt-ForgivenessforLatin America and the Caribbean

Countries, 28 INTERECONOMICS 30 (1993).
170 Id.
171 id.
72 See Alfred J. Puchala, Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 137, 138 (1989); but see
David W. Leebron, First Things First: A Comment on Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 Colum. Bus. L.

Rev. 173 (1989).
173 See Alfred J. Puchala, Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 137, (1989).
174 See id. at 139 ("In turn, countries owing the debt included in these securities should benefit from the
transfer of some loans from, among others, a financially troubled group of lenders, to investors potentially
better able to allow debtors to work through short-term problems.").

175 id.
176

See David W. Leebron, FirstThings First: A Comment on Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 Colum.

Bus. L. Rev. 173 (1989).
177 See Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, supra note 19.
178 See Leebron, supra note 176, at 188 ("[S]ecuritization is emphatically not a solution to the countries'
problems, and thus not really an answer to the problem at all").
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noticeable.17 9 However, when viewed as a matter of contract assignment these mechanisms do
not contravene the law, and if Greece were to assert this claim, a court would unlikely find
them as illegal.
C.

Enactment Procedure Compliance

In addition, the Committee claims that certain procedures, required before the
enactment of such loan agreements, were not fulfilled due to the bad faith of the creditors,
which also render the contract void. The procedures cited are known collectively as human
rights impact assessments ("HIRA"), and are intended to examine the potential impact of the
adjustment program's legislative measures on persons likely to be affected, prior to their
implementation. 180 The claim that HIRA's are required by international law is well-supported
by a variety of sources, including; decisions by the Court of Justice of the European Union,
treaties which require them, international guidelines, as well as various other international
instruments which generally protect human rights."' Greece claims that since no attempts
were made to assess the impacts of the macroeconomic adjustment measures in neither 2010
nor 2012, the creditors acted in bad faith and with malice intent. 182 Moreover, the Committee
states that subsequent findings by both the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs,
and by private individuals, have deemed these actions as, "lacking in transparency and
democratic oversight," due to the margirialization of the European Parliament, at least until
2013.183

The "duty of good faith" has doctrinally developed in contract law based on
equitable principals of fair dealing, and is recognized and codified in the Restatement of
Contracts, 18 4 the UCC,' s and in UNIDROIT.186 This duty, although seemingly difficult to
define precisely, 8 7 has been held to mean more than simply honesty in fact, and excludes
behavior that violates community standards of decency, fairness and reasonableness. 188
Consequently, the issue regarding the parties' duty of good-faith under the contract is
See id. at 188.
Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supra note 26, at 45-49.
181 See id. at 45-49 (including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("ICEDCR"), the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"), the European Social Charter ("ESC"), the
Charter of Fundamental Rights ("CFR"), the Treaty of the European Union ("TEU"), and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU")).
182See id. at 45-49.
183 See Hellenic Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt, supra note 26, at 48 (citing Pliakos A.,
Memoranda of Understandingand the Requirements of the EU Values [sic]).
184 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
179

180 See Hellenic

8' See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977).

PICC Art. 1.7(1) (2004).
In fact, only in English Contract law do they refuse to recognize a general duty of good faith W.H. Knight, Jr.,
Loan ParticipationAgreements: Catchingup with ContractLaw, 1987 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 587 (1987).
187 See JAY WINSTON &ARTHUR WINSTON, COMPLETE GUIDE TO CREDITOR AND COLLECTION LAW §3.07 [E]
(2012-2013 ed. 2013), HILLMAN, supranote 92 at 205-08.
'86

188See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §205, cmt. a. (1981) ("Good faith performance or

enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as "bad faith"
because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.").
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generally one of fact, and which varies with the context." In analyzing this fact, courts are
primarily concerned with parties that will be deprived of the benefit of its bargain, which
usually does not extend beyond the terms of their agreements. In fact, the majority of courts
have held that the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not create any additional rights or
190
obligations, but only confers obligations based on the promises of the original contract. The
New York Court of Appeals has held for example, that no obligation of good faith can be
191
implied "which will be inconsistent With the other terms of the contractual relationship." In
this holding, the court indeed acknowledged the implied duty of good faith in every contract,
but highlighted that the terms of the contract are what govern the rights and obligations of the
parties. 9' Similar holdings have also suggested that in order to bring a claim for breach of the
duty of good faith, the plaintiff must establish breach of an express provision of the contract,
cause of action. 193
recognizing that the duty of good faith cannot stand as an independent
In the case of Greece, they are claiming that failure to assess the potential impacts of
its austerity measures, an obligation recognized in international law, constitutes a breach of
the duty of good faith on the contract, and renders it void. However, this claim lacks
substantial merit, as it mistakenly considers an international preference, as automatically
binding on the parties as a matter of contract law.

Numerous cases have held that the duty of good faith may not be imposed
94
to override express terms in the contract.1 One notable example in the
context of a demand note is a Missouri Court of Appeals case in which the
court refused to hold that the duty of good faith limits the rights of a holder
of a demand note to call the obligation when the lender failed to disclose
that the bank was concerned about the loan, and believed it was the largest
risk exposure in the bank. 195 The court noted its reluctance in altering the
terms of the loan agreement, even with the existence of evidence
supporting a potentially nefarious motive:
"The additional term would be that the note is not payable at any time
demand is made but only when demand is made if such demand is made in
good faith. Thus [the duty of good faith] has no application because it does
& ARTHUR WINSTON, COMPLETE GUIDE TO CREDITOR AND COLLECTION LAW §3.07 [E]
(2012-2013 ed. 2013) ("The courts generally examine the fact situation to determine whether the party being
accused acted in such an abominable manner lacking any of the virtues of good faith and fair dealing.").
190Id. ("The court will not entertain the birth of a new obligation or new duty.").
191 Murphy v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293 (N.Y 1989) (considering the duty of good faith when
questioning the legality of a discharge pursuant to an at-will employment contract).
189 See JAY WINSTON

192 Id. at 304 ("In such instances the implied obligation is in aid and furtherance of other terms of the

agreement of the parties.").
19' See, e.g., Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 73 N.Y.2d (N.Y 1998) (holding that the duty of good
faith does not require a bank to provide advance notice to its customer of its intent to segregate and seize
collateral pursuant to a security agreement), Eaglehead Corp. v. Cambridge Capital Group, Inc., 170 F.Supp. 2d
522 (D. Md. 2001).
194See, e.g., Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distribution Systems, Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that a bank does not violate its duty of good faith when failing to extend additional credit even
after having done so in the past, when that was exactly what the contract called for).
'95 Centerre Bank of Kansas City, N.A., v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1985).
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not relate to the performance or enforcement of any right under the
demand note but in fact would add an additional term which the parties did
not agree to. 196,,
Similarly, the allegation of bad faith made in the Report, would impose an
.additional obligation on Greece's creditors, not bargained for by the parties. It follows that a
court of law would acknowledge that a material part of the agreed-upon exchange, Greece
repaying the loan, will not be undermined in light of an un-bargained for international
preference, albeit potentially sinister.
This allegation of bad faith, is perhaps part of a broader underlying theme of the
report; that the creditors interests are not really to implement macro-economic growth, but to
serve the interests of the financial world. This, although alters the duty of good faith
argument, questions intentions that are outside the reach of usual contract law; as not existing
at the time of contracting. Courts have also held that absent a real defense, when one party
simply makes a bad deal and is seeking revocation, such detriment will not be considered,
"[T]he general rule of freedom of contract includes the freedom to make a bad bargain." 197
VI. A DIFFERENT TAKE ON ILLEGALITY
When considering the allegations made by the report and the rhetoric of the writers,
one can easily be just as utterly confused as vehemently persuaded. In fact, this may be the
sole purpose of the publication. However, amid the florid legalese and implicit political
attacks, the report asserts a number of substantive and procedural illegality claims relating to
the loan agreements - none of which are likely to pass muster in court to render the Greek
government with a revocation right. The power to rescind is a potent power, which has
fostered heightened judicial discretion, as courts recognize that the principal of freedom to
contract is severely undermined when the government impinges on private agreements.
However, there is still a way to give voice to Greece under contract law, even when failing to
meet the revocation burden. This, I argue, is to be found within the doctrinal development of
the law of contracts and relevant remedies.
As noted, the unilateral revocation right that is sought by Greece has been a remedy
traditionally associated with classical contract theories, suitable for discrete, one-time
contracts with shorter durations and expectations. However, the context of long-term
international loans more appropriately calls for relational contract theory and its applicable
remedies to govern. In fact, relational contract theory has actually been said to specifically
apply to long-term sovereign loan agreements, as it recognizes the complexities considering
the number of parties usually involved, and each party's respective obligations and conflicting
political, social and economic rights. 19 That is, the sheer volume and long maturity of such
loans highlights the importance and applicability of relational contract theory in this context.
In fact, conventional litigation over sovereign loan agreements has even been deemed

16 Id. at 48.

197See Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., 486 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Mo. 1972), Higgins v. American Car Co., 324
Mo. 189, 193 (Mo. 1929); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §163, ilus.3 (1981).
'9'See Palzer, supra note 46, at 735 (defining sovereign loans as "one of the grandest relational exchanges in
the contract universe").
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problematic,199 as courts are simply unable to rid the "distortion of conventional thinking.
As a result, "delegitmization" of the formal contract and its interpretation is usually warranted
in order to avoid arcane legal rules and ineffective remedies.
Thus, relational contract theory would recognize the obvious objective of long-term
sovereign loan agreements: money for present-use for repayment over time. As such, it would
allow for "efficient breach" and for parties to avail themselves of more effective remedies,
such as the use of debt restructuring or rescheduling that allows for parties to renegotiate the
terms of the original agreement, either by spreading out the principal payment dates to a
20
longer period, reducing interest rates, or simply altering or removing conditions. '
Simply stated, the biggest problem with the allegations made by the Greek
government lies not within the merits of the claims per se, but rather, the requested relief.
Even Greece's strongest arguments, the ineffectiveness of the austerity measures and the
waiver of defense clause, are not strong enough to render the entire agreements void. It is my
contention, however, that these arguments can and should be used in a more effective way; a
convincing argument that seeks serious debt restructuring and renegotiation of the terms. This
2202 ,
is however
approach, although far from being properly considered a contemporary solution
20 3
sovereign
of
the
nature
that
have
noted
fact,
scholars
In
debt
crisis.
in
sovereign
the norm
the
underlying
of
applicability
and
enforcement
legal
the
on
limitations
inherent
debt places
contracts, 204 as restructuring and other non-legal mechanisms such as reputational concerns
and political pressures seem to "govern" instead.20 5
As such, I propose that the Truth Committee on public debt undertakes a re-drafting
of the report in order to elucidate the meritorious claims, place them within the prism of the
relational contract, and omit weak claims and any doctrinal references that gives rise to
classical theory scrutiny. This would not only restore morale, but political sovereignty as
well, and put the country in the best possible leveraging position to sit with creditors and
renegotiate the terms in a way more favorable to the Greek people.

199
See Palzer, supranote 46, at 731 (citing ALCOA v. Essex Group Inc., 499 F.Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(where a court reformed a 20-year aluminum conversion contract based on mutual mistake of the parties in
basing the price of services and aluminum on an index which did not include fuel prices, which skyrocketed in
1973) and Victor P. Goldberg, Price Adjustment In Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 527, 534-40

(criticizing the ALCOA decision because of its failure to consider opportunity costs in determinations and the
court's seeming ignorance of the purpose of long-term contracts).
200 See Palzer, supra note 46, at 731.

201See Palzer, supra note 46, at 740.
202As sovereign debt restructurings have occurred as far back as the sixteenth century. See generally Adam
Brenneman, Note, Gone Broke: Sovereign Debt, PersonalBankruptcy, and a Comprehensive Contractual

Solution, 154 U.PA. L. REv. 649 (2006) (citing Ross P. Buckley, Emerging Markets Debt: An Analysis of the
Secondary Market 6 (1999) (discussing the Spanish debt crisis of 1557, 1575, 1596, 1602, 1627, and 1647)).
203 See Carsten Thomas Ebenroth, The Changing Legal Frameworkfor Resolving the Debt Crisis:A

European'sPerspective,23 INT'L LAW. 629, 632 (1989) ("Sooner or later most indebted countries decide to
renegotiate their debt.").
204 See Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF
CRISES 55-63 (2006).
203 See Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default, 56 IMF Staff Papers 683, 690-97
(IMF Working Paper WP/08/238, Oct. 2008), https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08238.pdf.
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VII. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the idea of unenforceability in contract law has proven
controversial for a number of reasons grounded in sound public policy. Similarly, the maxim
pacta sunt servanda ("agreements are to be observed"), has long prevailed in the context of
contractual agreements, and has been historically noted for its significance. However, the
idiosyncratic nature of long-term loan agreements enables us, even through the otherwise
shallow lenses of contract law, to take a deeper look for alternative solutions. By following
the letter of the report, the Greek government has sought an unrealistic remedy that has little
contractual merit. However pleading in terms of the relational contract theory, might in fact
provide the Greek government's contract claims the voice that it deserves to efficiently and
robustly reach its creditors. This relief, although not as convenient and advantageous as
revocation of the loan agreements, is a realistic remedy that is provided for within the
purview of contract law, and if employed with the same zeal as was used in the drafting of the
report, may make a convincing claim for Greece, to have even the upper hand in the
negotiations. This is crucial given the propagating effect of the Greek debt crisis at this time.
However, this significance will have implications that reach far beyond the Mediterranean,
but for all sovereign debtors, as it would allow for classical contract law to provide an
argument for a relational contract remedy, perhaps adding a Greco twist on the old Latin
adage, caveat emptor, to endure in the future of contract law.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

25

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss1/12

26

Gyparakis: The Illegality of the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis: Contract Law's

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

27

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss1/12

28

Gyparakis: The Illegality of the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis: Contract Law's
MAURICE A. DEANE SCHOOL OF LAW AT HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS
Adonza S. Anderson, Interim Assistant Deanfor Enrollment Management
Andrew E. Berman, B.A., M.B.A., Assistant Deanfor Communications
Andrew Schepard, B.A., M.A., J.D., Senior Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs and Max Schmertz DistinguishedProfessorofLaw
Barbara Stark, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law andJohn DeWitt Gregory
Research Scholar
Brian T. Kaspar, B.S., M.B.A., Assistant DeanforAcademic Records and Registrar
Christopher Caruso, B.A., J.D., Associate Deanfor CareerServices
Courtney Selby, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Associate Deanfor InformationServices,
Director of the Law Library & Associate Professorof Law
Daphne Telfeyan, InterimAssistant Deanfor CareerServices
Dimitrios M. Doussi, B.A., Assistant Registrar
Dominick J. Grillo, B.A., M.S., J.D., Assistant Directorfor TechnologicalServices
Donna Brower, B.S., M.S., Ed., Directorof Development
Elizabeth Carline, B.B.A., J.D., Directorof CareerandProfessionalDevelopment
Eric Lane, B.A., M.A, J.D., LL.M., Dean andEric J.Schmertz Distinguished
Professorof Public Law andPublic Service
Franca Sachs, B.A., J.D., Executive Director ofPro Bono, Externship and
Fellowship Programs
Gerard Anderson, B.A., M.A., Directorof FinancialAid
Honorable A. Gail Prudenti, B.A., L.L.B., Executive Directorof the Centerfor
Children,Familiesand the Law and SeniorAssociate Deanfor Operations
Isaac Samuels, B.A., J.D., M.L.S., Reference Librarian
Jennifer A. Gundlach, B.A., J.D., Senior Associate Deanfor Academic Affairs and
ExperientialEducation and ClinicalProfessorof Law
Jessica Backman, Assistant Directorof Information Technology Services
Jodie D. Sperico, Senior DirectorofAlumni Affairs
John Tsiforas, B.A., J.D., DirectorofAnalytic and ProgramEvaluation & Assistant
DirectorofAcademic Support andBar Preparation,and Visiting Assistant
Professor ofAcademic Support
Judith N. Black, B.S., Directorof Special Events and Facilitiesand CLE Director

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

29

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
Kenneth J. Selvester, B.A., M.A., Associate Director of Communications
Kevin Shelton, B.A., M.A., J.D., M.S.L.I.S., Reference and Government Documents
Librarian
Linda P. Russo, M.L.S., B.A., Assistant Directorfor Technical Services
Lisa A. Spar, B.A., J.D., M.S., Assistant Directorfor Reference and Instructional
Services
Lisa Berman, B.A., Assistant Deanfor ExternalRelations
Lisa Monticciolo, B.A., J.D., Associate Deanfor Students and Administration
Maricia McCoy, Recruiter/Counselorfor Enrollment Management
Mary Godfrey-Rickards, B.A., J.D., M.L.S., Assistant Directorfor Access and
Collection Services
Mary T. Ruggilo, B.A., J.D., Senior Associate Deanfor Finance
Matthew G. Kieman, B.A., J.D., Directorofpilot Projectsfor the Centerfor
Children,Familiesand the Law and Managing Editor of Family Court Review
Megan Meighan, Associate Directorof Enrollment Management
Michael G. Wagner, B.S., Senior Web Developer
Michele LoFaso, Senior Director ofStudent Affairs
Nicole R. Lefton, B.A., J.D., DirectorofAcademic Support and Bar Preparation&
Assistant ProfessorofAcademic Support and Bar Preparation
Patricia A. Kasting, B.A., J.D., M.L.S., Reference Librarian
Rachel Andron, Directorof Public Sector CareerPlanning
Rou-Chia P. Lin, B.A., M.L.S., Access and Collection Services Librarian
Ryan Larson, B.A., J.D., Assistant Directorof Enrollment Management
Scott C. Filipkowski, B.B.A., M.B.A, Senior DirectorofInformation Technology
Services
Scott J. Glick, B.A., J.D., Directorof the Hofstra Law in D.C. Programand
Visiting Professorof Law
Steven Richman, B.A., J.D., M.A., Senior Director of Global Initiatives
Teresa Harrington, B.A., M.S., OperationsManager- Personnel
Tobie-Lynn Accardi, B.F.A., Creative Director
Toni L. Aiello, B.A., J.D., M.S.L.S., Reference Librarian
Vemadette Home, B.A., J.D., Director of CareerandProfessionalDevelopment
and DiversityInitiatives
Wendy Chaite, B.S., J.D., Directorof Careerand ProfessionalDevelopment
Yvonne V. Atkinson, B.S., M.S., Office Manager/Paralegal,Law School Clinical
Program

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss1/12

30

Gyparakis: The Illegality of the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis: Contract Law's
FACULTY
Robert Abrams, B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Burton C. Agata, A.B., J.D., LL.M., ProfessorEmeritus of Law
Erica Aisner, Special Professorof Law
Miriam Albert, B.A., J.D., M.B.A., LL.M., Professorof Skills and FacultyAdvisor
for the JD.IM.B.A. Program
Robert Archer, SpecialProfessorof Law
Kennisha Austin, Visiting Assistant Professorof Law
The Honorable Leonard B. Austin, B.A., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Kenneth Balkan, J.D., Special Professor ofLaw
Barbara S. Barron, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor ofSkills, Directorof the Trial
Techniques Program,Directorof Student Advocacy Programsand FacultyAdvisor
to Moot Court Board
Leslie R. Bennett, B.A., J.D., Special Professorof Law
Steven C. Bennett, B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Deborah Berger, B.S., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Lee Bergstein, Special Professor of Law
Robert Biancavilla, B.A., J.D., M.P.S., A.S., Special Professorof Law
The Honorable Joseph Bianco, Special Professorof Law
Richard Bock, B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Robert A. Baruch Bush, B.A., J.D., Harry H Rains DistinguishedProfessor of
Arbitration andAlternative Dispute Settlement Law
Yishai Boyarin, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Associate ClinicalProfessorof Law and
Associate Deanfor IntellectualLife
Lawrence Jay Braunstein, B.A., J.D., Special Professorof Law
William Burdo, Special Professorof Law
Alafair S. Burke, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Nancy Burner, Special Professor of Law
Allison Caffarone, Assistant Professor of Legal Writing
Juli Campagna, B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Legal Writing andAssistant
FacultyDirectorof InternationalPrograms
Andrez Carberry, B.A., M.A., J.D., Special Professor ofLaw
Ralph H. Cathcart, Special Professor of Law
Robin Charlow, A.B., J.D., Professorof Law
J. Scott Colesanti, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor ofLegal Writing

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

31

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
Ronald J. Colombo, B.S., J.D., Professorof Law and Associate Deanfor Distance
Education
Peter Contino, Special ProfessorofLaw
The Honorable R. Bruce Cozzens, Special Professorof Law
The Honorable Edmund Dane, Special Professorof Law
J. Herbie DiFonzo, B.S., J.D., M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Law
Janet L. Dolgin, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Jack andFredaDicker Distinguished
Professorof Health Care Law; Professor ofScience Education,HofstraNorthwell
School ofMedicine; Co-director, Hofstra Bioethics Center, and Director,Gitenstein
Institutefor Health Law and Policy
Tracy Dunbrook, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Visiting Assistant ProfessorofLaw
Akilah N. Folami, B.A., J.D., Professorof Law
Susan Fortney, B.A., J.D., LL.M., J.S.D., HowardLichtenstein Distinguished
Professorof Legal Ethics andDirector of the Institutefor the Study of Legal Ethics
Eric M. Freedman, B.A., J.D., M.A., Maurice A. Deane DistinguishedProfessorof
ConstitutionalLaw
Leon Friedman, A.B., LL.B., Joseph Kushner DistinguishedProfessorof Civil
Liberties Law
Linda Galler, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professorof Law
Mitchell Gans, B.B.A., J.D., Rivkin RadlerDistinguishedProfessorof Law
The Honorable Kenneth L. Gartner, B.A., J.D., SpecialProfessorof Law
Ashleigh Garvey, Special Professorof Law
Dolores Gebhardt, B.S., J.D., Special Professor of Law
James F. Gesualdi, Esq., B.A., M.A., J.D., Special Professorof Law
George Giuliani, B.A., M.S., M.A., J.D., Psy.D., Special Professor of Law
Scott J. Glick, B.A., J.D., Director of the Hofstra Law in D.C. Externship Program
and Special ProfessorofLaw
Barry Goldberg, SpecialProfessor of Law
Daniel J. H. Greenwood, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law
John DeWitt Gregory, B.A., J.D., Sidney and Walter Siben DistinguishedProfessor
of Family Law
Joanna L. Grossman, B.A., J.D. Professor ofLaw
Frank Gulino, B.A., J.D., Associate Professorof Legal Writing
Jennifer A. Gundlach, B.A., J.D., ClinicalProfessorof Law
Michael Haber, B.A., M.A., J.D., Associate ClinicalProfessor of Law and
Associate-in-Charge,Community and Economic Development Clinic
Marc L. HamroffSpecial Professorof Law

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss1/12

32

Gyparakis: The Illegality of the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis: Contract Law's
Robert Harper, Special Professorof Law
Carol Casazza Herman, B.A. J.D., Visiting Practitioner-in-Residencein
EnvironmentalLaw and SpecialProfessorof Law
James Edward Hickey, Jr., B.S., J.D., Ph.D., Professorof Law
The Honorable Richard Horowitz, Special Professorof Law
John Hogan, SpecialProfessor of Law
Bernard E. Jacob, B.A., J.D., Ph.D., DistinguishedProfessorEmeritus of Law
Michael D. Jaffe, B.A., J.D., SpecialProfessorof Law
Alan Jakimo, B.A., M.B.A., J.D., Special Professorof Law
Susan H. Joffe, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor of Legal Writing
Gary Kalbaugh, BCL, LL.M., Special Professor of Law
Kara Kaplan, Special Professorof Law
Elena Karabatos, Special ProfessorofLaw
David A. Kaufman, B.A., J.D., Special Professorof Law
Lawrence Kessler, B.A., J.D., Richard . CardaliDistinguishedProfessorof Trial
Advocacy
Avi Z. Kestenbaum, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Special ProfessorofLaw
Brian Klein, SpecialProfessorof Law
Fred Klein, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant ProfessorofLaw
Spencer Klein, Special Professorof Law
The Honorable Gary F. Knobel, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Special Professorof Law
Abe Krieger, SpecialProfessor ofLaw
Stefan Krieger, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law, Directorof CenterforApplied Legal
Reasoning and DirectorEmeritus of Hofstra ClinicalPrograms
Julian Ku, B.A., J.D., Professorof Law andFaculty DirectorofInternational
Programs
Katrina Fischer Kuh, B.A., J.D., Professor ofLaw
Lawrence Kurland, Special Professorof Law
Eric Lane, B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M., Dean and EricJ Schmertz Distinguished
Professorof PublicLaw andPublic Service
Anibal Rosario Lebron, J.D., LL.M., Visiting Assistant ProfessorofLegal Writing
Richard G. Leland, B.S., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Theo Liebmann, B.A., J.D., ClinicalProfessor of Law and Directorof Clinical
Programs
Barry Lites, Special ProfessorofLaw
Kim Luckey, SpecialProfessor ofLaw

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

33

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
Barbara A. Lukeman, B.A., J.D., Special Professorof Law
Andrew H. Lupu, B.A., J.D., SpecialProfessorof Law
Malachy T. Mahon, B.A., J.D., FoundingDean Emeritus
Lewis R. Mandel, A.B., J.D., LL.M., SpecialProfessorof Law
Irina D. Manta, B.A., J.D., Professorof Law and Directorof the Centerfor
Intellectual PropertyLaw at the MauriceA. Deane School of Law
Serge Martinez, B.A., J.D., ClinicalProfessorof Law
The Honorable Edward W. McCarty III, B.S., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Gerald McCloskey, Special Professorof Law
Kevin McElroy, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Legal Writing
Christopher T. McGrath, Special ProfessorofLaw
Gerard Messina, SpecialProfessorof Law
Janis Meyer, Special Professorof Law
Richard K. Neumann, Jr., B.A., Dipl., J.D., LL.M., Professorof Law
Christopher Nicolino, Special Professor of Law
Andrew Oringer, J.D., M.B.A., A.B., Special Professorof Law
Ashira Ostrow, B.A., J.D., ProfessorofLawand Associate Deanfor Research and
Faculty
Mark Padin, B.A., M.S., J.D., Associate Professor ofAcademic Support
Peter Parcher, Special Professor of Law
Curtis Pew, B.A., M.P.P.A., J.D., Visiting ClinicalProfessor of Law
Damian Pieper, Special Professorof Law
John Pieper, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Special Professorof Law
Troy Pieper, SpecialProfessor of Law
Jack M. Platt, Esq., B.A., J.D., Special Professorof Law
Neal R. Platt, B.S., J.D., L.L.M., SpecialProfessor ofLaw
Rona L. Platt, B.S., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Seth A. Presser, J.D., Special Professorof Law
Andrew Reiss, Special Professor of Law
Arianne Reyser, SpecialProfessorof Law
Joseph Richetti, SpecialProfessor of Law
John L. Rivkin, B.A., J.D., Special Professorof Law
Anibal Rosario Lebron, J.D., LL.M., VisitingAssistant Professor of Legal Writing
Jared Rosenblatt, Special Professorof Law
Paul Rubell, B.A., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Ben B. Rubinowitz, B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
James Sample, B.A., J.D., Professorof Law

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss1/12

34

Gyparakis: The Illegality of the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis: Contract Law's
Andrew Schepard, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor of Law andDirector of the Center
for Children,Families and the Law
Robert Schwenkel, SpecialProfessor of Law
Courtney Selby, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Associate Deanfor InformationServices,
Directorof the Law Library & Associate ProfessorofLaw
Rita Sethi, Special Professorof Law
Grant Shehigian, Special Professorof Law
Gregory H. Shill, B.A., M.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor ofLaw
Norman I. Silber, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Professorof Law
Jeffrey Silberfeld, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professorof Law
Ronald H. Silverman, B.A., J.D., DistinguishedProfessorEmeritus of Law
Roy D. Simon, B.A., J.D., DistinguishedProfessorofEmeritus of Law
William M. Skehan, B.A., M.B.A., J.D., Special Professor of Law
David Smith, SpecialProfessorof Law
Judd Sneirson, B.A., J.D., Visiting Associate Professorof Law
Lisa Spar, B.A., J.D., M.S., Special Professor of Law
Barbara Stark, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor ofLaw andHofstra Research Fellow,
Associate Deanfor IntellectualLife
Amy R. Stein, B.A., J.D., Professorof Legal Writing,Assistant Deanfor Adjunct
Instruction,and Coordinatorof the Legal Writing Program
Michael Steinberg, Special Professor of Law
Jacob L. Stevens, B.A., J.D., Visiting Associate ClinicalProfessorof Law
Daniel M. Sullivan, B.A., J.D., SpecialProfessor ofLaw
Michael Vecchione, Special Professorof Law
Robert Wagner, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law
Vern R. Walker, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Professor of Law andDirectorof the
Research Laboratoryfor Law, Logic and Technology
Bennett J. Wasserman, B.A., M.A., J.D., Special Professorof Law
Stephen Weiner, B.A., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Joel Weintraub, A.B., M.D., J.D., Special Professor of Law
Karen Weiss, Visiting Assistant Professor ofLegal Writing
Carolyn Reinach Wolf, B.A., M.B.A., M.S., J.D., Special ProfessorofLaw
Lauris Wren, B.A., J.D., ClinicalProfessor ofLaw and Directorfor the LGBT
Fellowship
Patrick Young, SpecialProfessor ofLaw
Elizabeth M. Nevins, B.A., J.D., Assistant ClinicalProfessorof Law Attorney-in

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

35

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
charge, CriminalJustice Clinic

FRANK G. ZARB SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION
Barbara J. Church-Kattan, Directorof Graduate CareerPlacement
Brian Caligiure, Assistant Deanfor Administration
Dr. George Papaioannou, Vice Dean
Dr. Patrick J. Socci, Dean
Jeffrey D. Mon, DirectorofRecruitment
Kevin B. Taylor, Executive Directorof Graduate Programs
Lisa A Welch, Associate directorof Graduate Programs
Lisa A. Kellerman, Associate Directorof Graduate CareerPlacement
Ms. Gioia P. Bales, Associate Dean
Patricia Salama, Directorof Outreach Programs
FULL TIME FACULTY
Dr. Ahmet K. Karagozoglu, Professorof Banking & Finance
Dr. Andrew C. Spieler, Associate Professorof Banking & Finance
Dr. Andrew M. Forman, Associate Professorof Marketing & 1B
Dr. Anil Mathur, Chair, Department of Marketing & 1B
Dr. Anoop Rai, Professor of Banking & Finance
Dr. Anthony Basile, ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Barry Berman, Professor of Marketing & 1B
Dr. Benny Barak, Professorof Marketing & 1B
Dr. Bernard H. Dickman, Associate Professorof QM/IT
Dr. Boonghee Yoo, Professorof Marketing & InternationalBusiness
Dr. Charles A. McMellon, Associate Professor of Marketing& 1B
Dr. Charles H. Smith, Professor of Management, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Cheryl R. Lehman, Professor ofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Daniel Tinkelman, Associate ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Dave Flynn, Professor ofManagement,Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. David N. Sessions, Associate Professorof QM1IT
Dr. Deb Sledgianowski, Associate Professor ofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Debra R. Comer, Professorof Management, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Edward J. Zychowicz, Professorof Banking & Finance

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss1/12

36

Gyparakis: The Illegality of the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis: Contract Law's
Dr. Ehsan Nikbakht, ProfessorBanking & Finance
Dr. Elaine R. Winston, Chair,Department ofIT/QM
Dr. Elaine Sherman, ProfessorMarketing & lB
Dr. Elizabeth K. Venuti, Chair, Department ofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Farrokh Guiahi, ProfessorofIT/QM
Dr. Janet A. Lenaghan, Professorof Management,Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Joel R. Evans, ProfessorofMarketing & 1B
Dr. John F. Affisco, ProfessorofIT/QM
Dr. K. G. Viswanathan, Chair, Department of Banking & Finance
Dr. Kaushik Sengupta, Assoc. Professorof Management, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Keun S. Lee, Associate Professorof Marketing & IB
Dr. Laura H. Lally, Professor ofIT/QM
Dr. Li-lian Gao, Chair,Dept. of Management, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Lonnie K. Stevans, Associate ProfessorofIT/QM
Dr. M. J. Paknejad, ProfessorofJT/QM
Dr. Mahesh Chandra, Associate Professorof JT/QM
Dr. Matthew C. Sonfield, Professorof Management, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Meral Binbasioglu, ProfessorofIT/QM
Dr. Mohammed H. Tafti, Professor ofIT/QM
Dr. Na Wang, Assistant Professorof Banking & Finance
Dr. Nancy A. White, Associate Professorof Banking & Finance
Dr. Nathan S. Slavin, ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Ping Su, Asst. Professorof Management,Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Rahul K. Bishnoi, Associate Professorof Banking & Finance
Dr. Ralph S. Polimeni, ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Richard C. Jones, Associate ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Richard Hayes, Assoc. Professorof Management, Entrepreneurship& GB
Dr. Rick T. Wilson, Assistant Professorof Marketing & 1B
Dr. Robert D. Campbell, Professor of Banking & Finance
Dr. Robert Fonfeder, ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Shawn T. Thelen, Associate Professor of Marketing & lB
Dr. Songpol Kulviwat, Associate Professor of Marketing & IB
Dr. Steven T. Petra, Associate Professor ofAccounting & Legal Studies
Dr. Wi S. Kim, ProfessorofBanking & Finance
Dr. William James, Professor ofMarketing & IB
Dr. Yong Zhang, ProfessorofMarketing & lB

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

37

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 12
Eugene T. Maccarrone, J.D, Associate Professor ofAccounting & Legal Studies
Martha S. Weisel J.D, Associate ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Robert Katz J.D, Professorof Accounting & Legal Studies
Steven B. Krull, Associate ProfessorofBanking & Finance
Stuart L. Bass J.D, ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies
Susan L. Martin J.D, Professor ofAccounting & Legal Studies
Victor Lopez J.D, Associate ProfessorofAccounting & Legal Studies

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol16/iss1/12

38

